The Perils of Bilateral Sovereign Debt
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. An earlier version of this paper circulated as “Central Bank Swap Lines as Bilateral Sovereign Debt.” For thoughtful comments and suggestions we would like to thank our discussants Saleem Bahaj, Paolo Varraso, and Vivian Yue as well as Manuel Amador, Cristina Arellano, Fernando Arce, Tamon Asonuma, Emine Boz, Marcos Chamon, Giancarlo Corsetti, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Julian Kozlowski, Guido Lorenzoni, Leonardo Martinez, Andy Neumeyer, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Adrian Peralta Alva, Facundo Piguillem, Francisco Roch, Tom Sargent, Mark L. J. Wright and participants at several academic conferences and seminars. Caio Dantas and César Ciappa provided excellent research assistance.