Job Ads as Signals: Evidence from a Priced Amenity and Worker Beliefs
We thank Henrik Kleven, Jann Spiess, Evan Soltas, and seminar audiences at the CIRANO-CIREQ Workshop on Markets with Frictions 2026, FRB Chicago, Hong Kong University, Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, Princeton, PhD Conference in Economics (Berlin, WZB), Sciences Po, SOLE 2026, Stanford Joint Applied Micro Seminar, UMass Amherst, Wharton, and WZB for useful discussions and comments and Gabriel Koiran Portier for excellent research assistance. The research was pre-registered with AEA RCT registry (AEARCTR-0017871) and received exemption from IRBs at Cornell University (IRB0150459) and Princeton University (19134). Any views expressed are solely those of the author(s) and so cannot be taken to represent those of the Bank of England or to state Bank of England policy. This paper should therefore not be reported as representing the views of the Bank of England or members of the Monetary Policy Committee, Financial Policy Committee or Prudential Regulation Committee. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
